Introduction
Current debate about whether to retain or abolish the specialist jurisdiction for labour law has increasingly focused on the issue of whether the common law can adequately deal with the employment relationship in a general setting. While this line of argument has a long history, especially in the United Kingdom leading up to the Trade Disputes Act 1906 {Fox, 1985 , the intrusion of a philosophically driven conception of what the common law ought to be has fundamẽntally recast the tenns of reference for the debate in its contemporary form
The aim of this article is to provide a critique of the key example of the "abolitionist" argument, that stẽms from the redefinition of the common law -R.A. Epstein's (1983a) "A Common Law for Labour Relations . . . " -by examining the behavioural . assumptions that accompany such an argument.
While it is generally acknowledged that Epstein's ideas have had a significant influence in shaping the "abolitionist" case (see for example Ryan and Walsh 1993 , Anderson 1993 , Brook 1990 , 1991 , there is no comprehensive or satisfactory attempt to provide an understanding of the nature of Epstein's argument. What follows is an attempt to fill this lacuna. It is divided into four sections. The first briefly reviews the debate about the status of the Employment Court. The second summarises Epstein's case for the use of common law principles and institutions to deal with employment relations, which fottn the basis of the present call for • Lecturer, Department of Management Studies and Labour Relations, Tamaki Campus. The University of Auckland. The author would like to thank Nigel Haworth for his guidance in the writing of this article. I have also benefited from comments by John Deeks and Rose Ryan on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank the editor of the Journal and the anonymous referees for their suggestions. The remaining errors are mine alone.
2
Nick Wailes the abolition of the Employment Court. Section three demonstrates that the philosophical assumptions that Epstein brings to his analysis enable him to dismiss many of the c~i~ticisms that have been levelled at his analysis. Section four argues that an adequate crtttque of Epstein must be founded on an assessm· ent of the philosophical assumptions that he brings to his · work on labour relations -specifically, the theory of self interest and self ownership.
The debate about the specialist jurisdiction
In a series of recent articles Walsh and Ryan have argued that the Employmẽnt · Ccntracts Act (ECA) is theoretically inconsistent. In part, they locate this inconsistency in the nature of the policy process by which the ECA was fmalised . Briefly, the fotmation of a new policy making community with strong links to employer groups, and like minded interest groups, fed into National's Manifesto aims for labour relations reforrn. While this refotm agenda allowed the issues of bargaining and representation to be resolved in a fairly straight fotward manner, the nature of the institutional structure to accompany these changes continued to be the focus of considerable debate. The result was a defeat of the institutional aspects of the "neo-conservative" refot n1 agenda during the Options paper exercise. Ryan and Walsh (1993) attribute this to the way that Department of Labour officials retained control over the crit· eria against which the institutional options were to be judged. They argue that as a result of this policy making process, the institutional structures which are provided for in the ECA are more in line with the pluralistic philosophy of previous labour r· elations legislation than what they call the "neo-conservative contractual based theory" that underpins section I & II of the Act
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. On the basis of this assessment of the policy process, they suggest that the nature of the labour relations institutions is the last remaining unfinished business of the process of labour market deregulation that has taken place over the last decade.
Much of the recent concern with the status of the Employment Court is associated with the publication of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation's (Business Roundtable/Employers Federation, 1992) joint assessment of the decisions taken by the Court. For Ryan and Walsh, it signalled the beginning of a concerted campaign advocating the abolition of the Employment Court in favour of civil court jurisdiction. At the time, they argued that in the event of a National Govemmẽnt being re-elected in the 1992 general election, the abolition of the Employment Court would become a serious policy issue. However, the initial difficulties for National in securing a majority and more widely, the downgrading of "neo-conservative" policy options in the face of the erosion of electoral power, seems to have precluded institutional reform in the short term. In fact, it could be argued that the "pluralist" aspects of the ECA have been strengthened by the introduction of a minimum wage for under twenty year olds. Nevertheless, the Business Roundtable/ Employers Federation assessment of the Employment Court clearly signposts an agenda for
The division of the ECA in to a "neo-conservative"' section (parts I & II) and a pluralistic section (parts III & IV) seems to have gained currency because of its neat,ess in analytical tenns. However this approach is misleading. In fact the emphasis on freedom of association rather than freedom of contract in part I of the Act represents a substantial moderation to Epstein's model which has not attracted any attention in the critical literature. The argwnent here is that the failure to come to tenns with Epstein' s argun1ent allows these types of ov, ersight. For a more rigorous assessn1ent of the ECA as it n1easures up to Epstein' s model see Brook 1991 . Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law 3 reform which stems from the same theoretical model as the ECA itself. Thus, there is still a need to consider the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment because of its implications for future policy reform.
Moreover, there are a number of important issues r ~ised by the Business Roundtable/ Employers Federation document. The fact that the two organisations should publish a document together lends considerable support to the view that the Employers Federation has become increasingly radicalised over the last eight or nine years (Walsh, 1992; Roper, 1993) . It also seems to reflect that the nature of the Employers Federation has been fundamentally altered by the ECA (Carroll , & Tremewan, 1993) . No longer directly involved in the bargaining process, it has adopted a position closer to that of the Business Roundtable as a lobbying group.
More interestingly, in the context of the debate about the retention of the specialist jurisdiction, the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment retains continuity with the position advocated by the Business Roundtable since at least the Green Paper process undertaken before the 1987 Labour Relations Act (Business Roundtable, 1986) . This is summarised by Anderson {1993). He identifies the criticisms of the Employment Court with the long standing claims that specialised institutions pay too much attention to the content of contracts and have been prepared to read wide ranging implied terms into voluntary contracts. Anderson notes that the assumption of this argument is that the civil courts would produce judgments that were significantly different than those of the Employment Court. This r, eflects a philosophical belief in how the courts ought to function rather than the way they actually do function. His conclusion is that the transfer of jurisdiction to the civil courts would not result in a significant change in the nature of decisions because the civil courts have consistently upheld, and deferr, ed to, the decisions of the Labour Court, the predecessor of the Employment Court. The implication is that the abolitionist case is one driven by theoretical assumptions derived from theorists like Epstein. ' On the basis of this ass, essment, it is important to examine the appropriateness of this philosophi, cal model to labour relations legislation in New Zẽaland.
Epstein's , common law for labour relations
The argument put forward by Epstein (1983a) stems from the application of his social and political philosophy to the issue of labour relations. These conclusions have typically been presented as the entire argument 2 .
Epstein's broad conclusion is that common law principles provide the most appropriate basis on which to regulate employment relationships because they are based on a sound understanding of human nature. This section seeks to outline the conclusions that Epstein reaches, and that have been subsequently taken up in the policy debate about specialist jurisdiction. It attempts to relate these conclusions to the behavioural assumptions he brings to his analysis .
.. -A good example is Brook (1990) . Her case for the refonn of labour legislation in New Zealand, including the abolition of a specialist jurisdiction, is heavily dependent on Epstein· s argument for a n1inimal labour statute \vhich gives predominance to common law principles. But it is clear that she is not a\vare of the philosophical inconsistencies this creates in her analysis. See Wailes (1993) for a n1ore detailed discussion. He argues that the common law, so defmed, creates legal entidements among without reference to personal status. He asserts that, apart from "unfortunate early m,~taaioa with the law of criminal conspiracy", the common law proper took a very sound palitioa in regulating employment relationships in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It \VII in this period that the common law proper most closely approximated Epstein's mocW of how it ought to function because of the widespread application of contract law to employment matters. The strength of such an approach, Epstein asse.tts, is that it is hued on the view that "every person owns his own person and can possess, use aad of his labour on whatever terms he sees fit" (1983a:l364). Further, this of entitlements asserts that the right to disposition allows the specification of the obligations that accompany the right to offer one's labour unhindered. Over die original distribution of wealth is likely to change as labour is exchanged for leisure or for capital and, within this framework, no limitation is placed on the voluntary · ~ of entitlements thus established.
Therefore, he argues that the decision to become an employer or an e•nployee is a private act, and cannot be the occasion for the increase of state regulation of private transactions. Rather, the role of the state is limited to ensuring the faithful eaforcea.t of the voluntary agreements reached by individuals. Further, the identity of the palies to voluntary transactions should be of no special concern of the state. Therefore, if · are fornted voluntarily, without the use or threat of force, fraud or inducen•ent to laleacb contract, they are easily integrated into the framework of a general theory of Epstein demonstrates the usefulness of this model by applying it to a number of cases related to labour relations. First, he argues that within this framework IJ'C not regarded as a criminal conspiracy and that the framework of tort law provides the in which they can legitimately act in constraint of trade. For this reason, he argues the closed shop can be accommodated within a common law framework provided that it the outcome of a voluntary transaction. Secondly, he suggests that the same lo&ic to the yellow dog contract because a voluntary agreement within the limits of tbat by the common law must be accorded respect regardless of its content. The fact tbat ar~ above zero and that differentials in wages exist between workers, for Epstein, · evtdence that workers do not have unequal bargaining power or rather, that of bargaining power are unimportant, because the contract is of mutual beaefit 1o and employees. Further, he argues that those who support the of contract are confusing economic inequality with duress, which would imply that d
Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law 5 involved duress. Workers have the choice to retain their contract with their union and seek employment elsewhere. This conclusion is not moderated by utilitarian considerations because workers that accept yellow dog contracts will demand some compensation for giving up the gains of union · membership. A third issue that Epstein addresses is that of picketing. He distinguishes two aspects of picketing -the threat to use force and the attempt to convey infotmation. He argues that the threat to use force is covered by the law of assault, and whilẽ the attempt to convey info11nation is legal, it is better to ẽxtend too much protection to the rights of others than too little in a situation where the two aspects are intertwined. Finally, he argues that there is no such thing as the right to strike because this involves the breach of contract. It is notable that the lockout, for Epstein, is analytically different from a strike, because the worker has the option to seek alternative employment, wherẽas an employer cannot easily take his/her production ẽlsewhere.
On tbe basis of a sustained critique of the provisions of the United States' National Labour Relations (Wagner) Act, Epstein's m~in conclusion is that the common law, as he defmes it, because of the simplicity of its procedures and principles, is well equipped to deal with the nature of labour relations. This is because the principles of his common law correspond to a situation in which the natural self interest of those involved is not mẽdiated by other concerns. The extension of this argument is that therẽ is no need for a specialist labour law of any type, other than a minimal code which merely states the common law principles that ought to guide approaches to employment relationships. Also it implies that there is no need for an institution that has expertise in labour matters because the theory of entitlements allows the unproblematic application of the general principlẽs of property, tort and contract to labour matters, which are simply issues of property rights. For this reason, Epstein's approach is commonly called a general law approach.
In a later paper (1984a) Epstein argues for the return of the contract at will doctrine. He summarises the case against the contract at will as one which assumes that the structure of the labour market leaves employees vulnerable to coercion and exploitation in a situation where employers are arbitrarily able to end contracts. Given his view that the employment relationship is simply an issue of property rights, he rejects this , assessment. While Epstein admits that contract at will is not ideal for ẽvery employment relationship, be argues that the parties should have the right to adopt this form of contract if they wish, and that this form should be implied in the absence of a specific agreement. For Epstein, the contract at will is important because it respects the freedom of individuals to negotiate on whatever terms they see fit. He also argues that the contract at will empowers both employers and employees to ensure that they obtain mutual benefit during the whole period of the employment relationship. He asserts that because either party has the power to end the · COntract at any time, the contract at will operates as a powerful constraint against thẽ abuse of the relationship by one party or another. It is this argument, taken together with his entitlement theory, which points to what Epstein means by "a" common law for labour relations -it is a specific view of how the common law ought to function based on philosophical principles of human action. He is not referring to the common law as it is understood in its technical legal sense.
The recent "abolitionist" case in New Zealand has made substantial use of these ideas. The Business Roundtable has consistently maintained that the employment relationship should be dealt with according to contractual notions and that these are best addressed in the within the limits of common law principles (which detetmine legality and capacity).
Combined with the theory of self interest, Epstein believes that this notion of self ownership renders criticisms of his common law for labour relations meaningless.
Epstein and the pluralist critique
Epstein has been the subject of a number of criticisms from industrial lawyers in the United
States. Broadly, these critiques have focused on two issues. Firstly, it is argued that Epstein presents the common law as if it was unchanging and that this is a major tlaw in his argument. Getman and Kohler (1983) argue that this presentation masks the limited time period in which contract doctrine governed the employment relationship. They argue that the labour relations legislation that Epstein is so hostile to represents a · of the traditional master and servant legal fottns that dominated employment law before the intellectual experiment of using contract law. A second and related criticism is put forward by Verkuil (1983) who argues that Epstein misrepresents the way in which the COIDIDOillaw has dealt with employment relationships in the period when the contract doctrine operated and, therefore, he fails to understand the reason that the employment relationship was taken away from the jurisdiction of the common law courts. ( 1983b: 143 5) . By itself the criterion of workability has no normative validity -unless they are prepared to establish a theoretical basis for pragmatism . Furthennore, in line with his view that contract law is closely related to human nature, Epstein ( 1980) does in fact argue that the common law should be static around the theory of entitlements, therefore rejecting the importance of accounts of how the common law has functioned. Epstein is not interested in h0w the common law has functioned but rather how it should function.
A second attempt to establish the basis for a specialist jurisdiction is put foJWard by Anderson (1993) . He distinguishes two separate aspects of a defence of specialist jurisdiction. He acknowledges that a pragmatic view, advanced by Ryan and Walsh, which focuses simply on the factual nature of employment disputes cannot by itself provide the case for a specialist jurisdiction as opposed to a specialised division of the High Court. Therefore, the case for the retention of the Employment Court needs to be founded on the nature of employment law. He dismisses the view that since the passing of the ECA, employment law has been subsumed into the general Jaw of contract because this leaves no sufficiently specialist field of labour law to allow the retention of a specialist jurisdiction.
Rather, he argues that employment law can be sufficiently differentiated from general law to justify specialist institutions. This view concentrates on the differences between legal forms and employment relations . He argues that common law is inherently individualistic and, as such, conflicts with the collective nature of industrial relations. Further, he believes that legal structures are adversarial and not well suited to reaching agreements between parties in an ongoing relationship. Therefore, Anderson suggests that employment relationship should be dealt with in an institutional setting which meets the following criteria of effectiveness -adequate provisions for proven violations of disputes of rights, relative speed, costs to the parties and the state, access by individual workers, and the perceptions of the parties directly involved. These criteria suggest the development of modes of legal reasoning rooted in the particular character of the employment relationship. Anderson argues that the contract form is an artificial legal construct which is not well suited to the nature of employment because it differs significantly from other commercial contracts. He, therefore, provides a theoretical basis for the workability thesis put forward by Ryan and Walsh. This is an elegant argument but it does not by itself provide a basis on which to critique Epstein, and by extension the case put forward by the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation for abolition of the specialist jurisdiction. Anderson does not adequately deal with the fact that Epstein's manifest assumption is that the employment relationship should be dealt with by contract law, and should indeed be treated as if it were any other commercial contract or property relation. Nor does he provide a satisfactory critique of Epstein's view that the employment relationship is best dealt with by a theory of entitlements because it equates most closely to human nature. Therefore, to be able to critique the present call for the abolition of the Employment Court, it is important to exan1ine the nature of the behavioural assumptions underpinning Epstein's analysis.
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Self interest and self ownership
The implicit assumption of the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment of the Employment Court is that the pluralist assumptions that have underpinned labour relations legislation, and fonn the basis for the criticisms discussed above, cannot be sustained in the face of Epstein's model. It is from this position that they suggest that the Employment Court's specialist jurisdiction is at odds, not only with the intention of the ECA, but also a sound understanding of how individuals behave. However, those who wish to draw these conclusions must accept Epstein's socio-biological and neo-liberal behavioural assumptions. This section argues that these behavioural assumptions are extremely problematic and any analysis based on them is seriously flawed .
How can Epstein claim that "the decision to become an employer or an employee is an entirely private one" ( 1983a: 1366) based on individual preference for risk? It is this statement which disarms much of the pluralist critique because it denies the fundamental assumption that there is an imbalance of power in the employment relationship and that this is the source of conflict in the workplace. However, Epstein's claim is not , an unproblematic notion. Rather it represents the summary of a complex set of behavioural assumptions which need to be examined further. Epstein ( 1990) stresses that the most important features of human action, in most situations, are best understood by the theory of self-interest. He argues that the normative basis of social and political philosophy ought to be derived from this positive (descriptive) observation. Epstein' s self interest thesis can be summarised as follows. In a wide variety of human activities, human action is best explained not by using social categories but rather by concentrating on biological factors. He argues that what is particular to humans, and therefore what constitutes their nature, is that they will maximise their self interest within certain moral, legal and social constraints . This he believes follows from the selection of the genotypes which maXimise self interest as a means of survival. He moderates this "standard model of self interest" with a number of devices, such as inclusive fitness & imperfect obligation 3 , but argues that in a situation of voluntary exchange between strangers, as in the employment relationship, a standard model of self interest most accurately predicts behaviour. Õn the basis of this fottnulation, Epstein attempts to assess the normative implications of self interest -distingui~hing the constant and variable features of human nature in order to determine the social arrangements that hold the greatest long term social advantage. This "'requires an understanding of the interaction between the self interest constant and diverse natural endowments " (1990: 103) . He argues that the persistence of self interest and variations in preferences is the strongest justification for the use of a decentralised system of property allocation, and therefore a common law regime based on these principles.
Using the biological derivation of self interest and the argument that (genetic) diversity produces differences in preferences and tastes for risk, he is able to argue that some 3 "Inclusive Fitness holds that all organisms act to maximise not only their individual fitness, but the fitness of their entire genetic line as well" ( Epstein, 1990 : 102 at footnote 2). This is a device that Epstein takes from social biology as a means of dealing with the difficulties that a simple egoistic assumption poses for his analysis. Imperfect obligation refers to religious belief. caring activity, etc.
• 10 Nick Wailes produces differences in preferences and tastes for risk, he is able to 1lllt individuals assume the nature of employees and others of employers dependius oa d • initial (biological) endowments. The fact that an employer has a higher for rilk him/her to have a greater say over the decisions in the business. Unlike Noziak (1974) . Epstein acknowledges that voluntary exchanges generate negative extelnatitiea, but that these are reduced as voluntary exchanges become routine for broad c~ af transactions. Therefore, a common law for labour relations allows for predictability ud reduces externalities from exchange. Further, he argues that a system on priwte property and individual liberty will generate the closest approximation to the 0J11iaa81 social contract, given natural differences in preferences that cannot be measured.
There are a number of probleans with Epstein's theory of self interest which · doub1l about its usefulness. Epstein's model stenas from the application of socio-biology to bia social and political philosophy. Rosenburg ( 1988) argues that for socio-biology to have aay no1mative influence there are two key issues it has to address. First, it must show tJuat the naturalistic fallacy 4 can be overcome by demonstrating how a purely factual of organisms can "underwrite their status as agents or loci of intrinsic value" (ibid:ll). Secondly, if this can be achieved, it must show that this propaty is common, and · to, all humans so that it will count as constituting our nature. This is exactly what tries to do. He deliberately ignores the critiques of Moore and Hume, and explicitly seeb to derive "ought" from "is". He uses the biological coDStant of self · to the second condition. However, Rosenburg argues that models that use socio-biolo&Y t satisfy this condition because its underlying tenet is that there is no such propaty co llli'·.t I and peculiar to each member of the species (Wilson, 1975) , nther they req11ire V8iatioa both within and between species. Therefore, it is not clear that the idea of a residual is consistent with a socio-biological methodology.
In the absence of being able to establish any direct no1mative importance, Rolenbura that the most that can be expected from these types of models is to tell a plaulible ltoiy, but questions the value of such an exercise. In effect Epstein's model confroldl the aaeDe fallacy -to infer that a particular no1mative conclusion is right or well gronncled a purely causal account of its origins. Epstein's model of self· therefore, is ....-y limited in its ability to underpin notmative conclusions. Given the role biological foundations play in Epstein's work on labour relations, it is important to an alternative evaluation of self interest. Lewontin et al. (1982) argue that models like the one being considered here the •eel for bourgeois society to explain continued inequalities that exist in capitalism. s work on labour relations seeks to justify, or dismiss as unimpo1t•nt, the · exist in employment relations. They argue that "the ideology of CXJUIIity has """'-a weapon for, rather than a weapon against, a society of inequality by theof the inequality from the structure of society to the nature of individuals " (1982:5) . is possible to situate this project in Epstein's work. He the inequaliti• dial between individuals in te1 ms of the process of natural selection, but at the ume time
The naturalistic fallacy was first identified by G. Moore in 1903 aod appHcs to •any t11at purports to de~ive a nonnative conclusion from purely factual (Bullock et al .• 1918) . the common law principle of not considering the positions of the parties to a contract, independent of the functioning of that contract.
Epstein's self interest thesis conforms to the three features of a biologically detẽttninistic argument. He locates inequality in the genetic inheritance of the individual. Thus he attributes an intrinsic merit and ability to those who arẽ better off, in this case employers. Secondly, because merit and ability are coded for in an individual's genes they are passed from generation to generation. Lewontin et a/. argue that this construction confuses the two meanings of inheritance -monetary and genetic, legitimising the passage of social power from generation to generation. Thirdly, Epstein uses the prẽsence of genetic differences to explain the devẽlopment of hierarchical structures as natural. In doing so, Epstein falsely equates innate with unchanging and wrongly assumes that he can overcome the naturalistic fallacy .
The second behavioural assumption that Epstein rẽlies on is that of self ownership. The key to his argumẽnt that the common law, as he defines it, can effectively deal with the employment relationship is his ability to assumẽ that ẽverybody owns their own labour, and can dispose of it as they sẽe fit. In other words he seeks to rẽduce employment to a matter of exchanges of property rights. This view runs counter to the pluralist position that labour is not simply a factor of production. Brook (1990) , who relies heavily on Epstein, argues that to say that labour is a commodity is simply to say that it has value. This model can be characterised as one which is structurẽd around a Lockean "person"'. Epstein, in relying on self ownership, places the ideal-typical "person" developed by Locke at the heart of his argument. Levine (1988) argues that the profound changes associated with the development of capitalism in the seventeenth century required the development of ideal-typical types to act as both a spur to adoption of capitalism and to justify the inequalities that capitalism produced. MacPherson (1962) argues that Locke's great achievement was to justify continued inequality in the face of a founal equality, and that thẽ means by which he did this was in arguing that each individual owned his or her own labour. This is because self ownership is not inconsistent with the right to alienate one's labour in return for a wage, thus justifying unequal property as a natural feature that exists prior to the fo1 1nation of civil society. Because, to partake in capitalism, individuals had to havẽ initial endowments, Locke's ideal typical type assigned (differential) initial ẽndowments to the (prẽ-social) statẽ of nature. Epstein uses socio-biology to construct these pre-social differences. Levine argues that this formulation is inherently pro-capitalist and excludes any notion of inequality from the analysis, because inequities are seen as a function of nature and not sociẽty. Therefore, Epstein's use of self ownership allows him to claim that there is no inequality in the employment relationship.
Furthermore, even given the general probletns associated with using a Lockean person, there are a number of specific problems with the way Epstein uses and constructs this ideal typical type that undermine his behavioural , assumptions. These will be dealt with briefly here. The first problem with Epstein's use of the Lockean person is that he ẽmploys this device on the basis of weak informational constraints about the slope of preferences, rather than on the basis of moral apriorism, as Nozick (1974) about the slope of preferences of individuals, but does not exclude this posaibility ia Therefore, his reversion to a Lockean fo11nation is a secondary device.
analysis then proceeds from a position which assumes the existence of the inclividull to the social -thus assuming that the Lockean person is primary.
A second, and related problem, is Epstein's reconstruction of the status of the Lockean framework. Locke argued that individuals had the right to the of labour as long as there was as much and as good left for oth&s. However, as Epatea -(1984c) in a world of scarcity, this condition is impossible to satisfy. He, -a welfare constraint -notmally known as a Lockean proviso. The appropriation of· resources, generated through self interest, does not affect the welfare of others they are not accessible to others. However, external appropriation is more prob as he has already acknowledged scarcity prevents satisfaction of the sufficiency priaciple. He attempts to overcome this by arguing that the extension of voluntary · limits the welfare losses associated with external appropriation. However, it is not at all tUt self ownership necessarily implies justifiable control over extetnal resources, except whem it is already assumed that a capitalist market exists and that this is just. Cohen (1985 Cohen ( & 1986 demonstrates that even where individuals are self owning, joint control of ~ resources can result in a just distribution. This is contrary to Epstein's implicit that self ownership necessitates a hierarchical social structure. Broadly, the slalUI of self ownership in Epstein's model is uncertain and confused, and the logical · that he claims for his analysis of labour relations relies on badly constructed behavioural assumptions.
Conclusion: a common law for labour relations?
The conclusions that follow from this discussion pose some saious the usefulness of Epstein's "common law for labour relations" u the theoretical for changes in labour legislation in New Zealand. Epstein's for the aboJilia of a specialist jurisdiction and the application of common law principles, u he defin• -...., to the employment relationship rest on a set of radical behavioural · Thilllticle has demonstrated a number of key features about Epstein's argument It his that
Epstein's case for the abolition of the specialist jurisdiction upon the theail of self interest and self ownership. It has been shown that these behavioural assumptimw ClllllOt be sustained. Specifically, the theory of self interest confronts the natunliltie lallacJ.
Without notmative status, it simply operates in a detetaninistic fashion to exclucle from Epstein's analysis. Also, the use of the Lockean person is collfused both ia 11111 and its construction. The implication of this critique is that abolition of the Bmplo,aent
Court, and the application of the common law principles that · to employment relations, are likely to have adverse effects on initial endowments.
However, as has been noted, Epstein's model represents not only a call for the the specialist jurisdiction, but also a complete redefmition of the common law · it can be expected that a transferral of jurisdiction to the High Court would aot · alter the nature of the decisions that the Business Roundtable and ......... 
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generally, the logic of the argument against a specialist jurisdiction for labour law is not separate or different to the logic underpinning the Employment Contracts Act as a whole. This suggests that the behavioural assumptions that underpin the ECA are derived from a radical model of entitlements not capable of dealing with employment relationships. The extent to which the ECA deviates from the model put forward by Epstein means that there is still space for further radical refo1n1 of labour relations in New Zealand. Currently, the view is that the avenue of refotm is limited only to the institutional structure of the ECA. This view may need to be modified.
Finally, those who wish to advocate the retention of a specialist jurisdiction for labour law need to go back to frrst principles by outlining the behavioural assumptions that underpin a pluralist model of labour relationships. Attempts by Ryan and Walsh and by Anderson point the way for such a re-examination. However, this cannot be done in isolation from a critique of the Employment Contracts Act as a whole.
